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Abstract 
Parental responsibility laws hold parents accountable for the delinquent behaviors of their children 
even when parents’ actions are not the direct cause of an offense. Despite the prevalence of these 
laws, we know little about their perceived fairness. Is it reasonable to make parents vicariously re-
sponsible for outcomes they could not have foreseen and, if so, under what circumstances? Our series 
of three studies addressed those questions by systematically examining the impact of various situa-
tional and dispositional factors on public opinions regarding parental responsibility. Respondents 
attributed most of the responsibility for a crime to the child, and attributions of responsibility to the 
parents varied as a function of the child’s age. Case characteristics including the type of crime com-
mitted and the described parents’ actions versus inactions did not consistently influence responsibility 
attributions. We conclude that people feel rather lukewarm about the notion of vicarious parental 
responsibility and this indifference may be related to issues surrounding the laws’ enforcement. 
 
Keywords: vicarious responsibility, parental responsibility, juvenile delinquency 
 
All across the United States, cities and states have laws that penalize parents for the delin-
quent behaviors of their children. For example, an ordinance in Wilmington, Delaware 
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holds parents responsible for their minor’s actions when the minor is out past the city cur-
few (Curfew for minors, 2009). In Jacksonville, Florida, parents are ordered to pay for any 
graffiti damage committed by their minor son or daughter (Graffiti prohibited, 2009). Par-
ents of minors in Indian Shores, Florida, are responsible for ensuring that their children’s 
pets are not let loose in town (Restraint required, 2009). In Detroit, Michigan, parents have 
the broad “continuous duty” to prevent their child from “committing any delinquent act” 
(Parental duties, 2009). 
Although many jurisdictions have enacted such statutes and ordinances, we know ra-
ther little about whether people favor attributing this form of vicarious responsibility to 
parents. Research on public support of these laws deserves further attention for at least 
three reasons. First, public support of social issues can motivate the imposition of new laws 
and revision of existing laws. In fact, public support can be a proximate cause of policy 
changes (Page & Shapiro, 1983); witness the current trend toward imposing harsh immi-
gration laws in the southwestern United States. Although no public opinion data existed 
when initial parental responsibility laws were enacted, one can now gauge whether the 
laws command public support. Previous studies have shown only lukewarm endorse-
ment, at least as measured by global attitudes. We undertake a closer look at the circum-
stances that influence public opinion about parental responsibility. 
Second, public support can also influence enforcement of current laws (Warr, Meier, & 
Erickson, 1983). Especially when diminished resources result in the selective enforcement 
of existing laws, public officials will explicitly and implicitly opt to enforce those laws they 
believe are broadly supported by the public. Thus, assessing public opinion can be useful 
for explaining levels of enforcement. We also undertake that task in our current studies. 
Third, it is useful to gauge public opinion because those opinions are related to legal 
compliance; people are more likely to obey laws they perceive as legitimate and fair (Tyler, 
2006). Thus, it may be particularly important to examine how parents of teenagers view 
parental responsibility laws because their beliefs may guide the parents’ behavior. The 
laws’ proponents may have assumed that fearing legal responsibility, parents would exer-
cise more control over their children’s behavior. But if parents deride these laws, they will 
feel little compulsion to do so. We explore these possibilities by examining beliefs about 
parental responsibility in parents of teens. 
In general, people are willing to hold accountable individuals whose actions are caus-
ally related to a negative outcome, even if those actions were not the proximate cause. Does 
this generality extend to parents of delinquent youth? Should parents be held to answer 
for the actions of their children? To what extent are characteristics of the juvenile, the crime, 
and the parents’ conduct relevant to that question? To what extent do beliefs vary as a 
function of respondents’ characteristics? We address those questions by assessing whether 
case characteristics—including age of the child, nature of the crime, and behavior of the 
parents—and respondent characteristics—including gender and parental status—influ-
ence thoughts about the appropriateness of laws that make parents vicariously responsible 
for their children’s actions. 
We begin by examining the notions of direct and vicarious responsibility. Next, we ex-
amine the legal context in which parents can be held responsible for their children’s be-
haviors and describe previous research on the public’s views of these laws. Finally, we use 
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our series of three studies to focus on how case, offender, and respondent characteristics 
influence attitudes toward parental responsibility. 
 
Direct and Vicarious Responsibility 
 
Responsibility permeates everyday life (Cartwright, 2006) and the law (Hamilton, 1978) in 
the United States and beyond (Sanders & Hamilton, 1987). Attributions of responsibility 
are associated with notions of causality, moral accountability, and culpability when some-
one creates, fosters, or fails to inhibit an event (Cartwright, 2006). According to philoso-
phers, responsibility occurs in three different contexts: (1) in describing someone as a re-
sponsible person—meaning that there is something morally favorable about this person; 
(2) as an expectation that someone is responsible for something yet to happen—this person 
will do what needs to be done; and (3) as an attribution that someone was responsible for 
a past action, not necessarily that the person caused the action, but that it is appropriate to 
hold the person responsible for that action (Frankena, 1963). Our current studies are related 
to this third situation. 
Responsibility is the bond that connects an actor to an event and to the relevant rules 
that govern conduct (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994). When we 
make attributions of responsibility, we compare what a person did to what the person was 
supposed to do in light of her role (Hamilton, 1978). That is, roles people have dictate their 
obligations and the liability associated with failing to meet those obligations. Different 
roles demand different standards of accountability and impose different penalties for fail-
ure to meet those standards. 
Most psychological research on assigning responsibility relates to direct attributions of 
responsibility in which the person who actually caused the action or created the harm is 
deemed responsible (Shultz, Jaggi, & Scheiffer, 1987). Yet there are instances when respon-
sibility is attributed to someone other than the person who directly caused the harm (Fein-
berg, 1968). Sometimes referred to as vicarious responsibility or collective responsibility (Fin-
cham & Jaspars, 1980; Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003), this concept implies that people 
assign responsibility to those who were not directly related to the event (Denson, Lickel, 
Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006). Heider’s “most primitive level” of responsibility attrib-
ution is one of vicarious responsibility such that a person is held responsible for any effect 
that is somehow connected to him (1958, p. 113) even though the person did not possess 
personal control over the behavior (Schlenker et al., 1994). Studies of harm and moral 
blame suggest that individuals are indeed blamed for consequences they could not foresee 
or did not intend but that were set in motion by their conduct (Alicke, 1992). But Greene 
and Darley (1998) have shown that although people can attribute responsibility to multiple 
causal agents, they assign less responsibility to agents whose connection to an action is 
more remote or indirect. 
Testing hypotheses derived from the literature on moral philosophy, Shultz et al. (1987) 
presented stories in which one person caused harm to another and a third person was in-
directly implicated. The researchers varied the third person’s control over the wrongdoer’s 
harm-producing behavior (the third person either had control or did not) and the third 
person’s social standing in relation to the wrongdoer (either superior or equal). Ratings of 
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both causal and moral responsibility of the third person were higher when that person had 
control over the wrongdoer and was in a position of social superiority, perhaps because in 
those situations, the third person could have intervened to prevent the harm from occur-
ring. These findings suggest that a person who is in some way superior to another and 
who is able to control another’s behavior may be causally implicated in any harm created 
by that individual. 
These ideas were tested in a study that evaluated whether family and friends of juvenile 
offenders would be deemed vicariously responsible for the juveniles’ conduct (Lickel et 
al., 2003). Lickel and colleagues focused on the parents and other persons potentially in-
volved in the Columbine High School shooting. A few days after gunmen Eric Harris and 
Dylan Klebold led a massacre on their high school in Littleton, Colorado, Lickel and his 
colleagues asked members of the public about parent and peer responsibility for the school 
shootings. Both parents and peers were deemed vicariously responsible; parents were seen 
as responsible for reasons of omission (failing to act in a way that could have prevented the 
shooting), whereas peers were seen as responsible for reasons of commission (as members 
of the Trench Coat Mafia, they shared goals with the perpetrators). 
These findings relate to a specific, particularly heinous crime in which 15 people (in-
cluding the gunmen) were killed and 24 people were injured. The question remains whether 
parents are generally seen as responsible for the actions of their children (Denson et al., 
2006) and whether case characteristics, including the juvenile’s age and the nature of the 
crime, play a role in such opinions. Another important case characteristic alluded to by 
Lickel et al. (2003), concerns whether the parents committed or omitted a particular action 
that led to the juvenile’s misconduct. In the context of parental responsibility laws, parents 
can be held responsible whether their own conduct involved acts of commission or omis-
sion. Thus, we ask in the current research whether people will hold parents vicariously 
responsible, regardless of whether the parent actively contributed to the juvenile’s crime 
or simply failed to prevent it (i.e., a commission vs. an omission). 
In other settings, acts of omission are consistently judged as less immoral or less bad 
than acts of commission (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). Called the omission bias, people 
perceive the outcome of an omission as less intentional than the outcome of a commission, 
which leads to evaluating the behavior and the person less negatively (Kordes-de Vaal, 
1996). In studies examining the omission bias, the omission or commission always leads 
directly to the outcome, which contributes to the perception that acts of commission are 
more intentional and therefore that the actors are more responsible (Zeelenberg, van der 
Pligt, & de Vries, 2000). One objective of the current research was to examine whether that 
sentiment also applies to beliefs about the vicarious responsibility of parents for the delin-
quent acts of their children. 
 
The Nature of Parental Responsibility Laws 
 
The idea that parents should be legally responsible for the actions of their children is cer-
tainly not new. Under common law principles, parents may be held civilly liable for the 
tortuous actions of their children. Such a case would be difficult to prove because the plain-
tiff would have to establish the requisite “duty, breach, causation, and damages” (Ihrie, 
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1996). In other words, the plaintiff would have to prove not that the child’s action caused 
the damages but that there was a causal connection between the parent’s negligence and 
the harm suffered. The mere fact of a parent-child relationship does not satisfy the causal 
connection; rather there must be some clear connection between the parents’ action (or 
inaction) and the resulting harmful act by the child (Tomaszewski, 2005). 
As an alternative to the common law negligence suit against a parent, states in the 
United States have statutorily defined when parents can be held liable for their child’s ac-
tions. In fact, all 50 states have statutorily defined parental responsibility laws that make 
parents either civilly or criminally liable for the acts of their children (Brank, Kucera, & 
Hays, 2005). As shown in Table 1, three main forms exist—civil liability, criminal liability, 
and general involvement statutes. 
 
Table 1. Descriptions of Parental Responsibility Laws 
Type Description Example law 
Civil liability Plaintiff may bring a 
case against a parent of 
a child who commits an 
act resulting in property 
damage or personal in-
jury the child 
Idaho § 6–210, “Any person shall be entitled to recover 
damages in an amount not to exceed two thousand five 
hundred dollars ($2,500) in a court of competent juris-
diction from the parents of any minor, under the age of 
eighteen (18) years, living with the parents, who shall 
willfully cause economic loss to such person . . .” 
Criminal liability/ 
Contributing to the 
delinquency 
State can bring a case 
against a parent (or 
other adult) who con-
tributes to the delin-
quency of a minor 
Mississippi § 97–5-39, “. . . any parent . . . who willfully 
commits any act or omits the performance of any duty, 
which act or omission contributes to or tends to contrib-
ute to the neglect or delinquency of any child . . . shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall 
be punished by a fine not to exceed One Thousand Dol-
lars ($1,000.00), or by imprisonment not to exceed one 
(1) year in jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” 
General involvement State can require parent 
to participate in the ju-
venile’s delinquency 
case 
Nebraska § 43–290, “to promote parental responsibility 
and to provide for the most equitable use and availabil-
ity of public money . . . the court may order and decree 
that the parent shall pay, in such manner as the court 
may direct, a reasonable sum that will cover in whole or 
part the support, study, and treatment of the juvenile, 
which amount ordered paid shall be the extent of the 
liability of the parent.” 
 
Under civil liability, the most widely used of the three and the direct answer to the com-
mon law tort case, a plaintiff may bring a case against the parents for property damage or 
personal injury. A case under one of these statutes would be easy to prove (most are writ-
ten in strict liability terms); however, the statutes generally have fairly low recovery limits 
(Brank et al., 2005). 
Under criminal liability, the guardian or other adult may be held criminally responsible 
for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. These laws apply when an adult does some 
action that encourages delinquent behavior by a child. 
General involvement statutes are based upon legislative efforts to make parents more 
involved in the juvenile court process and include such things as requiring the parents to 
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pay for court costs, restitution, and treatment, and to participate in the juvenile’s case 
(Brank et al., 2005; Davies & Davidson, 2001). Failure to comply with the parental involve-
ment requirements can lead to more punitive sanctions in some states (Brank, Hays, & 
Weisz, 2004; Tyler & Segady, 2000). 
The general involvement statutes in the United States are based on the premise of vicar-
ious responsibility. No parental mens rea is required, and the underlying principle is that 
the youthful misdeeds can be traced in some way to the parents (Harris, 2006). The legis-
lative intents suggest a desire to have the parents instill in their children a respect for the 
law, but a clear legislative goal is often lacking or undocumented (Brank et al., 2005). Harris 
(2006) speculates that the laws are more symbolic than they are pragmatic. 
Certainly, criminological research supports the idea that children’s behaviors can be 
linked to parental actions or inactions. For instance, research has consistently demonstrated 
that children who participate in illegal activities often have poor relationships with their 
parents or come from homes where parents are not actively involved in the children’s lives 
(Simourd & Andrews, 1994). The operative word though is often. Many instances exist 
where law-abiding juveniles have difficult home situations and delinquent juveniles have 
stable homes. This unpredictability may play a role in public opinion regarding parental 
responsibility and in the ways the laws are enforced. 
 
Public Support of Parental Responsibility Laws 
 
National polls show only moderate public support for parental responsibility statutes. One 
national survey found that only half (49%) of those sampled thought that irresponsible 
parents were to blame for the difficulties facing children (Public Agenda Online, 1999). A 
national Gallup Organization telephone survey found that people’s attitudes toward pa-
rental responsibility were quite supportive when the question asked about a parent’s re-
sponsibility in addition to that of the juvenile but less supportive when the questions asked 
about blaming and punishing only the parents (Brank & Weisz, 2004). Together, the results 
of these national surveys indicate that the public is unwilling to place sole responsibility 
on the parents when a juvenile commits a crime. 
This reluctance to find parents wholly responsible was apparent in a series of studies 
that found significant differences between global and specific attitudes about a described 
juvenile (Brank et al., 2005). Global attitudes like those measured in the national surveys 
were consistently more supportive of parental responsibility than were specific attitudes 
that were based on a described juvenile’s case. Even juveniles do not believe their parents 
are responsible for their delinquent behaviors. Brank and Lane (2008) interviewed juve-
niles in a post-adjudication residential facility and found that most of the juveniles did not 
think their parents were responsible for their delinquency. White and her colleagues em-
ployed self-referencing vignettes with parents in Australia (White, 2005; White, Augousti-
nos, & Taplin, 2007) and found that participants attributed less responsibility to the parents 
when the juvenile was described as older and knowing right from wrong (White et al., 
2007). 
Public opinion concerning the vicarious responsibility of parents will obviously be in-
fluenced by the constellation of factors in a specific case. In general, we know that people 
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attribute more responsibility to juveniles who commit more serious offenses (Samuel & 
Mould, 1986), have a prior record (Applegate, Cullen, Turner, & Sundt, 1996; Roberts, 
1997), are older (Ghetti & Redlich, 2001), are African American (Leonard, Pope, & Feyer-
herm, 1995), and are male (Mustard, 2001). We do not know about the factors that influence 
attributions of vicarious responsibility to parents. Thus, we examine the role of various case 
and respondent factors in our three studies. 
 
The Current Research 
 
Previous research on opinions about parental responsibility were limited because they re-
lied either on college student samples or national public opinion polling with few ques-
tions about parental responsibility and because they provided few contextual details about 
the juvenile, the parents, or their respective behaviors. The current series of studies used 
vignette methodology that broadened the types of case characteristics we could examine 
and allowed us to assess whether specific parental behaviors, namely their actions and 
inactions, influence public perceptions about parental responsibility. It also allowed us to 
determine whether parents think of these issues differently than nonparents. We began by 
determining which case and offender factors were most important to this analysis. 
 
Study One: Determining the Importance of Case and Offender Characteristics 
 
The first study employed a fractional factorial design to establish which case and offender 
characteristics would be most useful to the more substantive studies that followed. Using 
vignette methodology, we systematically manipulated the case characteristics of offense 
seriousness, premeditation, and type of crime, and the offender characteristics of race, age, 






The sample consisted of 246 participants (41% male) from a large southeastern university. 
Five participants were removed because they were parents (n = 2)1 or did not answer the 
manipulation check questions correctly (n = 3). Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 37 with 
a mean age of 20.78 (SD = 2.25). The majority of the sample was White (72.2%). Students 




A 25 + 2 fractional factorial design was employed to examine seven independent variables 
within a vignette about a juvenile crime. A fractional factorial design is a useful technique 
to employ when the inquiry area does not have extensive prior research or a coherent the-
ory from which to guide experimental choices (Stolle, Robbennolt, Patry, & Penrod, 2002). 
The seven manipulated variables included four offender characteristics: gender (male or 
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female), age (9 or 15), race (White or Black), and previous record (yes or no); and three 
case-related characteristics: seriousness of offense (high or low), type of crime (person or 
property crime), and premeditation (yes or no). By utilizing the fractional factorial design, 
we had 32 different vignettes with approximately eight participants per cell. Because we 




Scenarios. The one-page scenarios described a juvenile referred to as J.T.R. The crime was 
described as either an assault during a mugging or vandalism to a gas station (person or 
property crime, respectively). We manipulated seriousness with the crime outcomes. High 
seriousness for mugging resulted in the victim dying, and low seriousness resulted in a 
quick trip to the emergency room and full recovery. High seriousness for the property of-
fense resulted in destruction of the gas station, and low seriousness resulted in minimal 
damage that was easily repaired. We manipulated the premeditation of the crime by de-
scribing J.T.R. as happening upon a metal pipe that he or she used in the crime or taking a 
metal pipe from home in order to commit the crime described. For all of the vignettes, we 
included a statement that a woman in a nearby house saw the entire incident and called 
the police. The police then apprehended J.T.R. while he or she was running from the scene 
of the incident with the metal pipe that was used in the crime. 
 
Perceptions of parental responsibility. Because of the known general versus specific var-
iation in opinions (Applegate et al., 1996; Brank et al., 2004; Moon, Wright, Cullen, & 
Pealer, 2000), we asked participants about both their general and specific attitudes toward 
parental responsibility. The questions were: “Parents are responsible when their child 
breaks the law” (general attitude) and “J.T.R.’s parents are responsible for the crime com-
mitted” (specific attitude). Respondents answered using a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 indicating 
“strongly agree.” To capture the general versus specific variance, a difference score was cal-
culated between the two questions for use as our dependent measure. 
 
Procedure 
Informed-consent forms and study materials were distributed to participants during three 
introductory statistics classes. The students completed the experiment during regular class 
time and took approximately 15 min to complete. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Overall, participants were significantly less likely to agree that J.T.R.’s parents were re-
sponsible for the crime (M = 2.23, SD = .86) than they were to agree that parents generally 
were responsible for juveniles’ crimes, M = 2.78, SD = .99. t(245) = 8.99, p < .01. The mean 
responsibility difference score calculated from these two scores was .55. 
Using the parental responsibility difference score as the dependent measure, we as-
sessed the effects of the manipulated variables and found two significant main effects: age 
of described juvenile and type of offense. Participants viewed the parents of the 9-year-old 
as more responsible than parents of the 15-year-old, F(1, 238) = 2.81, p < .10, η2 = .01, and 
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the parents of the juvenile who committed the personal injury offense as more responsible 
than parents of the juvenile who committed the property offense, F(1, 238) = 40.48, p < .01, 
η2 = .03. There was no main effect for prior record, seriousness of offense, race of the juve-
nile, premeditation, or juvenile’s gender. No interaction effects available for analysis were 
significant. Accordingly, we decided to examine further the effects of offender age and 
nature of the crime in the subsequent studies and introduced differences in parental be-
havior as well. 
 
Study Two: Examining the Influence of Parental Behaviors on Beliefs about Responsibility 
 
In addition to assessing effects of the juvenile’s age and type of crime committed on beliefs 
about parental responsibility, we manipulated the actions of the juvenile’s parents, de-
scribing their actions as either omissions or commissions. To do so, we altered the experi-
mental vignettes to suggest either that the parents left dangerous material where the juve-
nile could access them, or gave the child potentially hazardous materials—acts of omission 
and commission, respectively Because acts of commission generally garner stronger attrib-
utions of responsibility (Zeelenberg et al., 2000), we expected that the parents who were 
described as having committed (rather than omitted) actions would be seen as more re-
sponsible. In addition, we expected that the crime of personal injury would result in higher 
ratings of responsibility than a crime involving property damage, and that parents of 





We recruited participants (n = 142; 36% male; mean age = 20.58, SD = 3.34) from two public 
universities, one in the Rocky Mountain region (n = 63) and the other in the southeast (n = 
79). The samples were not significantly different from each other on any demographic 
characteristics or variable of interest except that the sample from the southeastern univer-
sity included more men (47% vs. 22%). Participants either volunteered with no compensa-
tion or received course credit in exchange for their participation. 
The racial makeup of the sample was 81% White, 9% Asian, 8.5% Hispanic/Latino, 6% 
Black, and 1% other (totals more than 100% because participants could choose more than 
one category). We discarded responses from 25 participants who either did not complete 
the questionnaire or failed the manipulation check. 
 
Design 
Study Two used a 3 (juvenile’s age) × 2 (crime type) × 2 (parents’ actions) between-subjects 
experimental design to empirically investigate participants’ beliefs about holding parents 
vicariously responsible in various situations. 
  




Scenario. We manipulated the juvenile’s age (9, 13, or 17),2 the type of crime committed 
(personal injury or property damage), and the type of action by the parent (omission or 
commission). The omission condition depicted the juvenile taking either fireworks (in the 
property damage scenario) or an unlocked shotgun (in the personal injury scenario) from 
his parents’ belongings. In both cases, the parents’ act of omission was failing to secure 
those items. The commission scenario stated that the parents directly purchased the fire-
works or shotgun for the juvenile. In both commission scenarios the parents’ behavior was 
within legally permitted limits; the shotgun was described as being used for hunting and 
the fireworks were being used during a family holiday show. The property damage sce-
nario described a juvenile who set the neighbor’s shed on fire with the fireworks because 
of a dispute with the neighbor. In the personal injury scenario, the juvenile took a shotgun 
from home to settle an argument with a classmate and shot the classmate in the thigh, 
resulting in injuries that were not life-threatening. In both cases, the amount of damages 
was estimated to be $24,389. Each scenario ended by saying that the juvenile’s parents were 
shocked to learn about the incident. The vignettes were all approximately one page long. 
 
Questionnaire. The questionnaire included demographic and manipulation check ques-
tions, and a question concerning attribution of responsibility for the incident. Specifically, 
participants assessed the percentage of responsibility of the child, his parents, his peers, 
society in general, and any other factors (See Hamilton, 1986). The total percentages were 
to add to 100%. 
 
Parental Locus of Control (PLOC) Parental Responsibility scale. To establish a measure 
that could control for notions of general parental responsibility, we adapted 10 questions 
from the Parental Responsibility subscale of the Parental Locus of Control (PLOC) scale 
(Campis, Lyman, & Prentice-Dunn, 1986). Among the items were these: “There is no such 
thing as good or bad children—just good or bad parents,” “A child’s behavior problems 
are no one’s fault but the parents’,” and “Parents whose children make them feel helpless 
just aren’t using the best parenting techniques.” Respondents used a 5-point rating scale 
where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. Higher scores reflected more agreement 
that parents are responsible for their child’s behavior. Even with modifications of the sub-
scale, Cronbach’s alpha (α = .76) was comparable to that obtained by Campis et al. (1986) 
when they tested the scale in its original form (reported as α = .77, p. 261). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were provided with consent forms and the questionnaire. They took between 
25 and 40 min to complete the study. Administration was done both individually and in 
groups. 
  




Parental Locus of Control 
Our sample had a normal distribution on the PLOC Parental Responsibility subscale (M = 
3.08, SD = .44) with no significant differences as a function of demographic characteristics, 
sample location, or manipulated variables. General PLOC Parental Responsibility scores 
were not influenced by variables of interest to this study. 
 
Responsibility Attributions 
Overall, participants placed the most responsibility on the juvenile described in the vi-
gnette (M = 53.17%, SD = 21.13). Parents received the next highest percentage (M = 24.65%, 
SD = 16.50). Participants held peers (M = 11.28%, SD = 8.29) and society (M = 10.03%, SD = 
7.54) similarly responsible. Very few participants indicated that there was another source 
of responsibility (M = 0.90%, SD = 4.74). 
Using the PLOC as a covariate and the percentage of responsibility assigned to parents 
as the dependent variable, we found main effects for all three manipulated variables. Par-
ticipants saw the parents as more responsible when the juvenile committed a personal in-
jury offense (M = 26.58%, SE = 1.63) as opposed to a property offense (M = 20.34%, SE = 
1.70; F(1, 132) = 7.20, p < .01, η2 = .04), and when the scenario described a parental commis-
sion (M = 26.13%, SE = 1.63) rather than an omission, M = 20.80%, SE = 1.68; F(1, 132) = 5.42, 
p < .02, η2 = .03. As expected, the parents were seen as more responsible when the juvenile 
was described as younger, but responsibility ratings for parents of the 13- and 17-year-olds 
were not significantly different, 9 years old: M = 28.40%, SE = 1.91; 13 years old: M = 21.98%, 
SE = 2.04; 17 years old: M = 20.02%, SE = 2.09; F(2, 132) = 5.08, p < .01, η2 = .05. Ratings of 
responsibility on the parent did not vary by respondents’ gender. See Table 2 for the re-
sponsibility ratings for parents and juveniles. 
 
Discussion 
Case characteristics affected attributions of parental responsibility as measured by percent 
responsibility assigned to parents. As expected, parents who omitted actions that could 
have prevented the crime were seen as less responsible than parents who committed ac-
tions that led to the crime; personal injury offenses garnered higher ratings of parental 
responsibility than property crimes; and parents of 9-year-olds were deemed more respon-
sible than parents of older youths. Because participants did not view parents of 13- and 17-
year-olds differently, we altered the age manipulations for Study Three to focus on just 
two more distinctly different ages. 
These results support prior research showing that individuals are generally willing to 
place some responsibility on parents (Brank & Weisz, 2004), though that effect is fairly 
weak. Overall, participants placed more than half the responsibility for the crime on the 
juvenile whereas the parents were deemed, on average, about 25% responsible. We next 
examined how parents of teenagers viewed the notion of parental responsibility and 
whether parental self-interest might influence their attitudes. 
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Table 2. Nonparent Sample, Main Effects of Manipulated Variables and Respondents’ Gender on 
Percent Responsibility (0–100%) Attributions Placed on Parents and Juvenile 
 M SE df MS F p η2 
Responsibility placed on parents 
Juvenile’s age        
   9 years old 28.40 1.91      
   13 years old 21.98 2.04 2, 132 914.98 5.08 <.01 .05 
   17 years old 20.02 2.09      
Crime type        
   Personal injury 26.58 1.63      
   Property damage 20.34 1.70 1, 132 1298.06 7.20 <.01 .04 
Action by parent        
   Omission 20.80 1.68      
   Commission 26.13 1.63 1, 132 976.41 5.42 .02 .03 
Respondent’s gender        
   Female 25.18 1.45      
   Male 21.18 1.91 1, 132 363.88 2.02 .16 .01 
Responsibility placed on juvenile 
Juvenile’s age        
   9 years old 48.80 2.72      
   13 years old 54.47 2.99 2, 132 1518.53 4.17 .02 .05 
   17 years old 60.27 2.97      
Crime type        
   Personal injury 51.12 2.41      
   Property damage 57.92 2.32 1, 132 1541.87 4.23 .04 .03 
Action by parent        
   Omission 56.04 2.39      
   Commission 52.99 2.31 1, 132 318.27 .87 .02 .01 
Respondent’s gender        
   Female 52.77 2.06  379.38 1.04 .31 .01 
   Male 56.26 2.71 1, 132     
 
Study Three: Examining the Influence of Parental Self-Interest 
 
The participants in Study Three were parents of teens or preteens. Our objective was to 
assess how case characteristics that we examined in Study Two would influence parents’ 
notions of vicarious parental responsibility. 
Attitudes about societal issues are often influenced by concerns of self-interest, espe-
cially when those issues can have immediate and adverse effects on respondents (Citrin & 
Green, 1990). So, for example, when Crowe and Bailey (1995) questioned respondents about 
attitudes toward laws intended to reduce drunken driving, nondrinkers expressed more 
support than regular drinkers. When these researchers asked whether parents should be 
legally liable for the consequences of their children’s underage drinking, parents of chil-
dren under age 18 were less likely to say yes than were nonparents. Parents may have 
assigned less responsibility for reasons of self-interest; they might have felt personally vul-
nerable to the laws’ mandates. 
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We had another reason to suspect that parent-participants would be less likely than 
nonparents to hold parents answerable for children’s misconduct. Because parents of teens 
have a better understanding of the complexities of child rearing (Ross & Van Willigen, 
1996) and of the multiple factors that influence a juvenile’s decision to commit a crime, 
including factors that are outside of a parent’s control, they would be less likely than non-
parents to hold parents responsible. 
Study Three used the same materials as in Study Two, though we described the juvenile 
as either 10 or 16 years old. We hypothesized that the personal injury case would garner 
more parental responsibility than the property crime, that acts of commission would result 
in higher attributions of parental responsibility than acts of omission, and that the younger 
the child, the more responsibility would be attributed to the parents. We also expected to 





Parents (n = 118) of middle school and high school students attending a university labora-
tory school participated in this study. Twenty-one percent were male. The mean age was 
44.22 years (SD =  6.44). The majority (75%) was White, 20% were Black, 8% Hispanic/La-
tino, 2% American Indian/Native Alaskan/Hawaiian, 1% Asian, and 4% other (totals more 
than 100% because participants could choose more than one category). Participants had on 
average 2.59 children with most (68%) having two or three children (maximum reported 
was 6). Participants were mailed $10 when their questionnaires were completed and re-
turned. The sample does not include participants we removed because of missing values 
(n = 3) and incorrect manipulation check answers (n = 1). 
 
Design 
This study used a 2 (juvenile’s age) × 2 (parental action) × 2 (crime type) between-subjects 
experimental design to empirically investigate the attributions of responsibility by parents 




Scenario. This study used the same core scenarios and questionnaires as in the previous 
study with the juvenile described as either 10 or 16, the type of crime being personal injury 
or property damage, and the type of action by the parent being either an omission or com-
mission. 
 
Questionnaire. In addition to the questions used previously (i.e., attributions of responsi-
bility, demographics, manipulation checks, parental locus of control), we asked demo-
graphic questions that related specifically to parents (e.g., number of children) and their 
knowledge of parental responsibility laws. 
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Foreseeability. We also asked participants whether they agreed with the following state-
ment: “In this incident, the juvenile’s parents should have foreseen the consequences of 
their actions” (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The notion of foreseeability goes 
beyond responsibility and speaks to the preventability of the act. 
 
Appropriateness of legal outcomes. After explaining the various types of parental respon-
sibility laws, we asked participants to rank the appropriateness of different legal responses 
to the crime. The options were (a) the victim brings a civil case against the parents; (b) the 
state charges the parents with contributing to the delinquency of a minor; (c) the state re-
quires the parents to be involved in adjudication (the general involvement statutes described 
above); or (d) nothing happens to the parents. Participants indicated how much money 
damages they thought should be awarded to the victim who sued in a civil case. They also 
selected a level of severity for each of several sanctions associated with the crime of con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor. The options were (a) imprisonment ranging from 
none to 10 years or more; (b) a fine ranging from $0 to $25,000 or more; (c) community 
service ranging from 0 hours to 100 hours or more; (d) probation ranging from 0 years to 
5 years or more; and (e) no sanctions. To address the requisite knowledge component for 
a contributing to the delinquency case, we also asked participants, “Did the juvenile’s par-
ents knowingly contribute to his delinquent behavior in this incident?” Response options 
were yes or no. Participants also ranked the appropriateness of seven parental involvement 
options (where 1 = least appropriate and 7 = most appropriate) including (a) participate in 
court proceedings; (b) attend parenting classes; (c) participate in community service; 
(d) pay victim restitution; (e) pay detention costs; (f) attend counseling; and (g) no sanctions. 
 
Procedure 
Materials were sent home from school with students attending a university laboratory 
middle or high school. We requested that the parent who had most recently celebrated a 
birthday complete and return the questionnaire. Reminder letters were sent home with 
students one week after the initial packets were distributed. Five hundred forty-eight 
study packets were distributed, and 118 usable questionnaires were returned (response 
rate of 22%); however, that rate may be artificially low because some of the packets likely 




Parental Locus of Control 
Similar to Study Two, the sample had a normal distribution on the PLOC (α = .70) (M = 3.30, 
SD = .48) with no significant differences as a function of demographic characteristics, 
knowledge of laws, or manipulated variables. 
 
Responsibility Attributions 
As in Study Two, parent-participants placed the greatest responsibility on the juvenile 
(M = 47.59%, SD = 23.41). The juvenile’s parents received the next highest percentage 
(M = 36.88%, SD = 22.59) with society (M = 7.44%, SD = 7.67) and peers (M = 7.12%, SD = 6.87) 
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viewed similarly. Only a very few people indicated there were other sources of responsi-
bility (M = 0.91%, SD = 3.64). 
Using the percentage of responsibility assigned to parents as the dependent variable 
and scores on the PLOC as a covariate, we found only one significant main effect for the 
manipulated variables: the age of the juvenile (10 years old: M = 44.79%, SE = 2.54; 16 years 
old M = 26.03%, SE = 2.75) resulted in significantly different responsibility attributions to-
ward the parents, F(1, 110) = 24.79, p < .01, η2 = .15. As displayed in Table 3, neither the 
manipulation of parental omission versus commission, F(1, 110) = 1.43, p = .23, η2 < .01, nor 
the type of crime committed, F(1, 110) = 2.55, p = .11, η2 = .02, affected attributions of re-
sponsibility toward the parents. In contrast to the student sample, there was a main effect 
for respondents’ gender such that mothers rated the parents as more responsible (M = 37.80%, 
SE = 1.96) than did fathers, M = 26.13%, SE = 3.9; F(1, 110) = 7.06, p < .01, η2 = .04. 
 
Table 3. Parent Sample, Main Effects of Manipulated Variables and Respondents’ Gender on 
Percent Responsibility Attributions Placed on Parents and Juvenile 
 M SE df MS F p η2 
Responsibility placed on parents (0–100 %) 
Juvenile’s age        
   10 years old 40.90 2.73      
   16 years old 23.02 2.90 1, 110 8488.82 24.79 <.01 .15 
Crime type        
   Personal injury 29.15 2.74      
   Property damage 34.78 2.85 1, 110 873.74 2.55 .11 .02 
Action by parent        
   Omission 29.89 2.78      
   Commission 34.04 2.78 1, 110 490.89 1.43 .23 <.01 
Respondent’s gender        
   Female 37.79 1.96      
   Male 26.13 3.90 1, 110 2418.69 7.06 <.01 .04 
Responsibility placed on juvenile (0–100%) 
Juvenile’s age        
   10 years old 44.53 2.84      
   16 years old 60.78 3.02 1, 110 7017.57 19.00 <.01 .12 
Crime type        
   Personal injury 52.87 2.85      
   Property damage 52.44 2.96 1, 110 5.08 .01 .91 <.01 
Action by parent        
   Omission 54.78 2.89      
   Commission 50.54 2.88 1, 110 511.71 1.39 .24 .01 
Respondent’s gender        
   Female 46.52 2.03      
   Male 58.79 4.05 1, 110 2680.25 7.25 <.01 .05 
 
Foreseeability 
Participants generally agreed that the parents should have foreseen the delinquent activity 
described in the vignette (M = 3.68, SD = 1.07). There was a significant positive correlation 
between foreseeability and percent of responsibility placed on parents (r = .45, p < .01) and 
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a significant negative correlation between foreseeability and percent of responsibility 
placed on the juvenile (r = –.44, p < .01). 
Using foreseeability as the dependent variable and scores on the PLOC Parental Re-
sponsibility subscale as a covariate, only the age of the described juvenile had a significant 
main effect. F(1, 108) = 5.03, p = .03, η2 = .04, with the 10-year-old’s actions seen as more 
foreseeable (M = 3.76, SE = .15) than those of the 16-year-old (M = 3.30, SE = .16). As seen in 
Table 4, there were no other significant main effects of the manipulated variables or of 
respondents’ gender. 
 
Table 4. Parent Sample, Main Effects of Manipulated Variables and Respondents’ Gender on 
Perceived Foreseeability of Delinquent Behavior 
 M SE df MS F p η2 
Responsibility placed on parents (0–100 %) 
Juvenile’s age        
   10 years old 3.76 .15      
   16 years old 3.31 .16 1, 108 5.36 5.03 .03 .04 
Crime type        
   Personal injury 3.49 .15      
   Property damage 3.58 .16 1, 108 .188 .18 .68 <.01 
Action by parent        
   Omission 3.44 .16      
   Commission 3.63 .16 1, 108 1.01 .95 .33 .02 
Respondent’s gender        
   Female 3.70 .11      
   Male 3.37 .22 1, 108 1.99 1.87 .18 .02 
Note: Foreseeability (1 strongly disagree; 5 strongly agree) 
 
Knowledge of Laws and Appropriateness of Legal Outcomes 
When asked whether they had heard of parental responsibility laws before beginning the 
questionnaire, 64% of participants reported that they had. We asked respondents to con-
sider four potential consequences for the juvenile’s parents: the victim brings a civil case 
against the parents; the parents are charged with contributing to the delinquency of a mi-
nor; the parents are required to be involved in adjudication; or nothing (see Table 1). Each 
option was explained, and respondents ranked the possible outcomes’ appropriateness. 
The highest-ranking option was the involvement option; 71% (n = 77) of parents indicated 
that this option was most appropriate. All other options were deemed much less appro-
priate: the victim brings a civil case was ranked as most appropriate by 15% (n = 16), the 
parents are charged with contributing to delinquency was ranked most appropriate by 
12%, (n = 13), and the option to “do nothing” was ranked most appropriate by 3% (n = 3). 
Our sample size combined with the number of manipulated variables and possible case 
outcomes precludes us from examining manipulated case characteristics (e.g., age of de-
scribed juvenile) with all outcome options. 
 
Civil case. Despite the fact that few respondents favored this option in our initial question 
about appropriate outcomes, the vast majority of our sample (91%) indicated that if the 
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victim brought a civil parental liability case, they would award damages. The description 
indicated that the victim was claiming $24,389 in damages. On average, participants who 
said they would award damages provided an amount similar to that figure (M = $23,280, 
SD = $4,402). 
 
Contributing to the delinquency of a minor case. Participants were divided on whether 
the juvenile’s parents “knowingly contributed to his delinquent behavior” with 51% (n = 60) 
saying they did. When the juvenile was described as a 10-year-old, significantly more par-
ticipants (70%) believed the parents had contributed to his behavior than when the juvenile 
was described as a 16-year-old, 30%; χ2(N = 118) = 7.65, p < .01, φ = .09. Participants rated 
the contribution of parents to the juvenile’s delinquency as greater with the parents’ com-
mission than with their omission, 60% and 40%, respectively, χ2(N = 118) = 4.08, p < .05, 
φ = .06. Neither the type of case described (i.e., personal injury vs. property damage), nor 
the respondents’ gender influenced whether they saw the parents as contributing to the 
delinquency. 
When asked about potential sanctions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
almost half indicated that the parents should receive no sanctions (48%). The other half 
indicated varying levels of support for other sanctions (they could endorse more than one). 
Imprisonment of the parents was not a popular option with only 9% indicating that it was 
appropriate. Thirty-four percent thought probation was an appropriate option, 47% thought 
a fine was appropriate, and 49% thought community service was appropriate. 
 
Parental involvement options. Participants were asked to rank the appropriateness of 
seven options for parental involvement. The following percentages are for the participants 
who used the 1–7 ranking system as instructed and used each number only once. Pay vic-
tim restitution garnered the greatest support (51% said it was most appropriate). There 
was much less support for other options: no sanctions, 12%; participate in court proceed-
ings, 12%; attend counseling, 12%; attend parenting classes, 6%; pay detention costs, 3%; 
and participate in community service, 2%. Our sample size combined with the number of 
manipulated variables and possible parental involvement options precludes us from ex-




As in Study Two, participants assigned the largest share of responsibility for these crimes 
(48%) to the juvenile and less responsibility to the parents (37%). Mothers placed more 
responsibility on the juvenile’s parents than did fathers (38% vs. 26%). Surprisingly, parent-
participants attributed more responsibility to the described parents than did nonparent-
participants in Study Two (37% vs. 25%). Perhaps parents of teens (especially mothers) 
level some responsibility on other parents because through various self-serving biases, 
they come to believe that they would not have acted in a similar manner. Hence, it may be 
easier to demean other parents by holding them responsible. It is also possible that because 
parental responsibility laws are infrequently enforced, few parents would feel vulnerable 
to their sanctions. If this is the case, then their responses would not be influenced by any 
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self-interest, and they would be free to impose accountability on parents as they wish. An-
other possible explanation is that the parents who responded to our questionnaire may be 
more involved in their children’s lives and more responsible generally and therefore may 
be more inclined to hold other parents responsible when negative events occur. 
In deciding whether parents are responsible for the delinquent acts of their child, parent-
participants focused on the age of the juvenile; they deemed parents of a 10-year-old more 
responsible than parents of a 16-year-old. Contrary to our hypotheses and in contrast to 
findings from Study Two, ratings of parental responsibility were not influenced by the 
type of crime committed by the juvenile or the parental actions that preceded the crime. 
We also asked whether the parents should have foreseen the juvenile’s crime because, 
presumably, foreseeable acts can be prevented. Although parent-participants generally 
thought the described parents should have foreseen the crime, only the manipulated age 
of the juvenile had an effect on foreseeability ratings. The foreseeability of the crime was 
not dependent on whether the described parents had committed an act (i.e., giving the 
juvenile a gun) or omitted an act (i.e., failing to lock up their gun), or on whether the crime 
resulted in personal injury or property damage. 
Most participants thought that there should be some sort of sanction on the parents, but 
very few thought that the intervention should be a classic punitive response (e.g., impris-
onment). For the most part, participants focused on restorative goals: they wanted the par-
ents to be involved in the child’s adjudication in order to provide the victim with restitution 
and obtain counseling with the young offender. Such responses demonstrate that partici-
pants were less concerned with punishing the parents than with ensuring that some good 




Responsibility can arise absent direct causation when a person is answerable for the actions 
of another who directly causes the harm. For example, employers are answerable (in tort 
law, “vicariously liable”) for the acts of employees within the scope of employment. Simi-
larly, parents are broadly answerable for the behavior of their children. The questions we 
address here concern the public’s views on parents’ legal responsibility. 
Our intent was to assess how people attribute responsibility to parents for the actions 
of their children. We were interested in how they consider the circumstances related to the 
harm, and whether their status as parents (vs. nonparents) affects their beliefs. The specific 
questions we addressed were these: Is it reasonable to ascribe responsibility to parents who 
neither caused a harmful act nor could foresee it? Does it matter whether the child who 
caused the harm is younger and impressionable or older and independent? Does it matter 
whether the child caused physical injury to another person or destroyed property? Should 
parents’ acts of omission be deemed comparable to acts of commission, as parental respon-
sibility statutes require? 
We found that overall, the largest share of responsibility for juvenile crime rests with 
the juvenile offender, but that observers attribute some responsibility to parents as well. 
The readiness to hold parents responsible varied as a function of situational variables, 
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notably the age of the child. Parents of younger youth were judged more responsible for 
their child’s criminal conduct than parents of older youth. 
According to vicarious responsibility theory and previous research (e.g., Shultz et al., 
1987) for one individual to be held responsible for the actions of another, the first individ-
ual must have control over or be in a superior social situation to the actor. Though parents 
are assumed to be in a superior position to their children, the age of the child influences 
the control parents can exert. It is a commonly held belief that the younger the child, the 
more influence his or her parents wield, and the less social standing the child has. The 
bond between parenting behavior and a child’s actions weakens as a child ages (Tomas-
zewski, 2005). The attenuated relationship between parents’ control and older teens’ be-
haviors, combined with the fact that older teens are more likely than younger teens to en-
gage in acts of delinquency, apparently makes parental responsibility laws seem relatively 
ineffectual as applied to parents of older children. 
Whereas parental responsibility statutes make no distinction between parents’ acts of 
omission and commission and hold parents accountable regardless of the nature of the 
conduct that led to the transgression, people typically view these circumstances differ-
ently. They perceive that outcomes emanating from acts of omission are less predictable 
and thus less intentional than outcomes that follow from acts of commission. Thus, we 
expected to find higher levels of responsibility assigned to parents who actively committed 
an act that led to the crime than to parents who passively omitted an act. 
Nonparent-participants responded this way, but parent-participants showed no differ-
ences in attributions of responsibility to the described parents as a function of their con-
duct. Perhaps the experience of parenting teens enhances one’s ability to anticipate conse-
quences of their and others’ actions. In essence, through their own experiences, the parents 
come to realize that leaving a weapon or fireworks accessible invites their use by teen and 
preteen children as directly as does actually providing those objects to their children. To 
their minds, the described parents who failed to act should have known better. A possible 
area of future work would be to compare in more depth parents who have younger versus 
older children and parents who have juveniles who have been charged or found delin-
quent versus juveniles who have not. We expect that these differences in parenting expe-
riences would influence opinions of other parents’ responsibility. 
There are several limitations to the current set of studies. First, although vignette meth-
odology presents a richer set of contextual information than survey methodology, that in-
formation is nonetheless an abbreviated synopsis. With more detail about the child, the 
parents, and the nature of their home life and relationship, respondents’ assessments of 
the parents’ responsibility may be somewhat different. Second, although we probed re-
spondents’ thoughts about the foreseeability of the crime, our findings would have been 
enhanced by asking about other criteria related to accountability, including the extent to 
which parents could control the outcome, had justification for their conduct, coerced the 
child, and desired the outcome, and the extent to which the crime was causally connected 
to their actions. Third, we acknowledge that asking laypeople to make criminal and civil 
judgments was problematic given that they had little instruction, few guidelines, and es-
sentially no experience. Finally, we used a college student sample in our first two studies 
to determine the manipulated factors in Studies Two and Three; had we used a more 
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diverse sample initially, we may have chosen to examine different factors for our later 
studies. These findings should be interpreted cautiously. 
We have been careful to distinguish the concept of responsibility from those of causa-
tion, blame, and guilt. Parental responsibility laws make parents accountable even in situ-
ations where their actions were not the primary cause of an offense and in which they were 
neither legally blameworthy nor factually guilty. Although the general public often con-
flates these concepts (Hamilton, 1978), they are different constructs (Mantler, Schellenberg, 
& Page, 2003) and should not be used synonymously (Gailey & Lee, 2005). Still, we believe 
there may be some merit in borrowing concepts from Alicke’s (2000) culpable control the-
ory of blame assessments to understand why people are willing to attribute at least some 
responsibility to parents. 
The essence of Alicke’s theory is that the desire to hold an actor accountable skews peo-
ple’s perception of the degree to which that actor controlled the outcome. Especially in 
situations where a victim is grievously injured by a young person who is unable to provide 
any meaningful compensation, observers may cast around for other sources of wrongdo-
ing and potentially deeper pockets. Parents are obvious targets. By inferring that a child’s 
parents had some control—however tenuous—of the outcome, observers can justify their 
attributions of responsibility on the parents. 
But despite people’s willingness to impose some responsibility on parents, they still 
hold the child most accountable for a wrongdoing, and nonparent respondents were even 
less likely than parent respondents to assign responsibility to parents of an errant child. 
We suspect that our respondents’ disapproval of complete vicarious parental responsibil-
ity may reflect one reason the laws have not been widely enforced. 
Regarding enforcement, Harris (2006) surveyed police chiefs and prosecutors in Oregon 
and asked them, among other things, how often they issued citations and prosecuted these 
cases.3 She found that in nearly three fourths of the Oregon communities in her sample, 
parents were never cited for violations of parental responsibility laws. In most of the re-
maining communities, citations were issued only occasionally (4–11 times per year) and in 
only two towns did police chiefs cite more than 20 times per year. Prosecutions were also 
rare: nearly 80% of district attorneys said they rarely or never prosecuted parents for vio-
lating these ordinances. 
There are undoubtedly multiple explanations for the lack of enforcement, including in-
sufficient resources for law enforcement personnel, their perception that the laws lack 
“teeth,” and little reason to believe that they serve as a deterrent. Harris (2006) suspects 
that these laws are largely symbolic and that their purpose is to shape parenting norms 
and convey a message about acceptable parenting practices. Our data suggest that lack of 
enforcement may also derive from the fact that the public is, at best, lukewarm to the idea 
of making parents answerable for the actions of their children. We suspect that in the 
minds of many, parents’ actions constitute a crucial component of healthy development 
yet cannot sufficiently explain delinquency and holding parents responsible for their 
child’s conduct will do little to remedy the problem of juvenile crime. 
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